UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

8-26-2014

Keserovic v. State Respondent's Brief Dckt. 41890

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Keserovic v. State Respondent's Brief Dckt. 41890" (2014). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 5105.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/5105

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

HARIS KESEROVIC,
Docket No. 41890
Petitioner-Respondent,
Ada County Case No. CV-PC-2012-17517
vs.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF PETITIONER-RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

HONORABLE MICHAEL McLAUGHLIN
District Judge

GREG BOWER
Ada County Prosecutor

ALAN TRIMMING
Ada County Public Defender

SHAWNA DUNN
JAMES K. DICKINSON
Special Deputy Attorneys General
200 West Front Street, Suite 3191
Boise, ID 83702
(208) 287-7700

KIMBERLY J. SIMMONS
Deputy Public Defender
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107
Boise, ID 83702
(208) 287-7400

ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR
PETITIONER-RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... iv
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ....................................................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case ............................................................................................................... 1
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings .............................................................. 1
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL ................................................................................................ 6
ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................................... 7
I.

The District Court Correctly Decided The Issue Presented On Appeal When It
Reversed The Magistrate Court's Summary Dismissal Of Mr. Keserovic's PostConviction Petition For Relief And Remanded For Evidentiary Hearing Because
Mr. Keserovic Presented The Court With A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact And
Provided Admissible Evidence Supporting His Claims ...................................................... 7

A.

Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 7

B.

Standard of Review ............................................................................................................. 7
a. Standard of Review Below ...................................................................................... 8

C.

The District Court Correctly Decided The Issue Presented On Appeal When It
Reversed The Magistrate Court's Summary Dismissal Of Mr. Keserovic's PostConviction Petition For Relief And Remanded For Evidentiary Hearing Because
Mr. Keserovic Presented The Court With A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact And
Provided Admissible Evidence Supporting His Claims .................................................... 10

D.

The District Court Correctly Held It Was Error When Mr. Keserovic Was Not
Informed Of The Immigration Consequences Of His Guilty Plea .................................... 12

E.

The District Court Correctly Held That The Magistrate Court Erred When It
Found That Mr. McKinnie's Deficient Performance Was Cured By Inaccurate
Advisements From The Court And State's Counsel ......................................................... 13

11

a. Mr. Keserovic Presented A Genuine Issue of Material Fact That He Was
Prejudiced By Mr. McKinnie's Deficient Performance ........................................ 13
b. The District Court Correctly Decided That The Magistrate Court Erred
When It Found That Any Prejudice From Counsel's Deficient
Performance Was Cured By The State And The Court ......................................... 15

F.

1.

It Is The Burden Of Defense Counsel To Provide Accurate Advice
Under Padilla ............................................................................................ 17

11.

The District Court Correctly Held That The State And The Court
Provided Inaccurate Notice To The Defendant Regarding
Immigration Consequences, Thus The Notice Is Insufficient Under
Padilla ....................................................................................................... 21

The District Court Correctly Remanded This Case For Further Proceedings ................... 23
a. This Court Must Only Look To The Appellate Record In Rendering A
Decision ................................................................................................................. 24
b. A Defense Attorney Must Fully And Accurately Advise His Or Her Client
Of The Consequences Of A Guilty Plea ................................................................ 25

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 26
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ..................................................................................................... 27

111

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases

Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758 (1988) ...................................................................................... 9, 10
Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159 (Ct.App.1986) .................................................................. 8
Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612 (2011) ........................................................................................ 7, 12
Barley v. Smith, 149 Idaho 171, 176 (2010) .................................................................................... 6
Clark v. State, 92 Idaho 827 (1969) ................................................................................................. 7
Commonwealth v. Clarke, 460 Mass. 30 (2011) ........................................................................... 17
Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759 (Ct.App.1991) ............................................................................ 8
Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269 (Ct.App.2002) ........................................................................ 7, 9
Hassettv. State, 127 Idaho 313 (Ct.App.1995) ............................................................................... 9
Hoover v. State, 114 Idaho 145 (Ct.App.1988) ............................................................................... 8
Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 673 (2008) ............................................................................ 7
McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847 (2004) ....................................................................................... 12
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970) ................................................................................. 9
Murrayv. State, 121 Idaho 918 (Ct.App.1992) ............................................................................... 7
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010) ........................................................................... passim
People v. Bautista, 115 Cal.App.4th 229 (2004) ........................................................................... 18
People v. Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d 398 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) ........................................................... 19
Powell v. Alabama, 287 US. 45 (1932) ........................................................................................ 17
Ramirez v. State, 113 Idaho 87 (Ct.App.1987) ................................................................................ 8
th

In re Resendiz, 25 Cal. 4 230 (2001) ..................................................................................... 10, 15
Ricca v. State, 124 Idaho 894 (Ct.App.1993) .................................................................................. 9
Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671 (2009) ......................................................................................... 12
Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644 (Ct.App.1994) ................................................................................ 8
Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65 (Ct.App.1990) ............................................................................. 8, 9
Salazar v. State, No. 11-11-00029-CR, slip op. (Tex. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2011) ........................... 19

lV

Schultz v. State, 153 Idaho 791, 796 (Ct.App.2012)
Ex Parte Solitaria, 2010 WL 2789032 (Tex. App.-Austin) .......................................................... 16
State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676 (1983) ...................................................................................... 7
State v. Green, 149 Idaho 706, 708 (Ct.App.2010) ................................................................... 6, 21
State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 596 (1992) .................................................................................... 7
State v. Miller, 134 Idaho 458,462 (Ct.App.2000) ......................................................................... 7
State v. Nunez-Valdez, 200 N.J. 129 (2009) .................................................................................. 19
State v. Paredez, 136 N.M. 533, 537-38 (2004) ...................................................................... 10, 15
State v. Sandoval, 249 P.3d 1015 (Wash. 2011) ...................................................................... 15, 19
State v. Yahya, 2011 WL 5868794 *5 (Ohio App. 10 Dist. 2011) ................................................ 16
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) ..................................................................... passim
US. v. Bonilla, 637 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 2011) ................................................................................ 19
Statutes

Idaho Code§ 18-2407(1) ................................................................................................................. 1
Idaho Code§ 18-2407(2) ......................................................................................................... 1, 2, 6
Idaho Code§ 19-4903 ..................................................................................................................... 8
Idaho Code § 19-4906 ........................................................................................................... 7, 8, 20
Idaho Code § 19-4907 ............................................................................................................... 8, 23
Idaho Code§ 19-519 ....................................................................................................................... 1
Constitutional Provisions

8 U.S.C. § l 101(a)(43)(G) ................................................................................................... 4, 10, 13
8 U.S.C. § l 182(a)(9)(A)(ii) .......................................................................................................... 11
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(l)(B) ................................................................................................................. 2
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) ......................................................................................................... 10
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution ..................................................................... 16
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution ..................................................... 9, 15, 16, 22

V

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The State of Idaho appeals the District Court's Memorandum and Decision and Order,
filed January 14, 2014, reversing the decision of the Magistrate Court to summarily dismiss
Mr. Keserovic's Post-Conviction Petition and remanding the case for the Magistrate Court to
hold an evidentiary hearing.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On or about January 6, 2012, Mr. Haris Keserovic, a non-citizen, was arrested in Ada
County for the crime of Grand Theft, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 18-2407(1). A case was filed on
January 9, 2012, bearing Ada County Case No. CR-FE-2012-0000311. On January 10, 2012,
Mr. Jeffrey McKinnie, a licensed attorney practicing in Boise, Idaho, filed a Notice of
Appearance on behalf of Mr. Keserovic. A Preliminary Hearing was waived on March 12, 2012,
and the case was bound over to District Court. Mr. Keserovic was arraigned on an Information
charging him with the crime of Grand Theft on April 4, 2012, and a not guilty plea was entered.
The case was set for Pre-Trial Conference on June 20, 2012, and Jury Trial on June 25, 2012.
Mr. Keserovic filed a Notice pursuant to I.C. § 19-519 and Idaho Criminal Rule 12.1 on
April 25, 2012, asserting an alibi defense. A Stipulation to Continue the Jury Trial was filed on
May 10, 2012, and after a hearing on May 16, 2012, the Jury Trial was rescheduled to July 16,
2012. At a hearing held on June 20, 2012, the case was remanded to the Magistrate Court
pursuant to an offer from the State for Mr. Keserovic to plead guilty to the misdemeanor crime of
Petit Theft pursuant to LC. § 18-2407(2). On the advice of counsel, Mr. Keserovic signed a
written plea agreement pursuant to I.C.R. Rule 11 (f)(l )(C), indicating he would plead guilty to
Petit Theft, and agreed to specific sentence as an appropriate disposition of the case. The
sentence agreed upon consisted of a 365-day jail sentence, with 305 days suspended for a period
1

of 2 years on supervised probation. The remainder of the jail sentence would be served in jail or
in a work release program, if available. Fines and court costs were also included as a term of the
agreement. On June 26, 2012, Mr. Keserovic entered a guilty plea, was convicted of a violation
ofI.C. § 18-2407(2) and sentenced pursuant to the Rule 11 agreement.
On or about September 10, 2012, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (hereinafter
"ICE") assumed custody of Mr. Keserovic. He was held without bail pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(c)(l)(B). On September 26, 2012, Mr. Keserovic filed a Petition for Post-Conviction

Relief seeking relief from the judgment of conviction entered in CR-FE-2012-0000311, and
requested a new trial and/or other appropriate relief. (R. at 5). Mr. Keserovic claimed that
defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by providing inaccurate advice regarding the
immigration consequences of pleading guilty to a violation of I.C. § 18-2407(2) with a 365-day
sentence, and that such advice prejudiced Mr. Keserovic. Additionally, Mr. Keserovic asserted
that the State and the Court's attempt to alert Mr. Keserovic to the possible immigration
consequences of a plea to Petit Theft did not cure the prejudice he suffered from counsel's
deficient performance.
The Petition for Post-Conviction Relief informed the Court that Mr. Keserovic was a
native and citizen of Bosnia-Herzegovina who had been lawfully residing in the United States
since 1998. Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, filed 9/26/12, p.1 (hereinafter "PCR"). (R. at
225). He fled Bosnia as a refugee in the wake of the Bosnian War. Id. He was admitted to the
United States as a young boy and subsequently adjusted his status to that of a Lawful Permanent
Resident (hereinafter "LPR"). Id. Mr. Keserovic's parents reside lawfully in the United States, as
do his two younger brothers, and he is the father of a four-year old U.S. citizen son. Id.
Additionally, Mr. Keserovic has extended family throughout the United States including an aunt
and numerous cousins. Id.
2

According to the PCR and attached affidavits, Mr. Keserovic informed Mr. McKinnie
about his citizenship status as a non-citizen, and they discussed possible immigration
consequences of a criminal conviction on more than one occasion. Id. See also Affidavit of Haris
Keserovic, p.1 (R. at 26) and Affidavit of Jeffrey McKinnie, p.1 (R. at 28). Mr. Keserovic was
visited by an immigration officer while he was in the custody of the Ada County Jail who told
him that he would be deported if he was convicted of a felony offense. Affidavit of Keserovic, p.
1. (R. at 26). Mr. Keserovic passed this information on to his counsel, Mr. McKinnie. Id.
Mr. McKinnie subsequently advised Mr. Keserovic of the offer to plead guilty to a misdemeanor
petit theft, and advised him to take the offer. Id. See also Affidavit of McKinnie, p.1. (R. at 28).
He told Mr. Keserovic that he "wouldn't have any problems with immigration and that within
sixty (60) days [he] would have [his] life back." Affidavit ofKeserovic, p.l. (R. at 26).
During the plea colloquy and sentencing hearing, the State's attorney and the Court both
advised Mr. Keserovic that pleading guilty to the crime of petit theft subjected him to possible
deportation. PCR, p.3. (R. at 7). Mr. Keserovic leaned over to counsel, Mr. McKinnie, and
inquired about such consequences, to which Mr. McKinnie replied, "They are just trying to scare
you." Affidavit of Haris Keserovic, p. l. (R. at 26). According to Mr. Mc Kinnie's affidavit, the
State's attorney stated on the record that because the charge was a theft offense with a one year
sentence, that Mr. Keserovic would be pleading guilty to a felony. Affidavit of McKinnie, p.l.
(R. at 28). Mr. McKinnie informed Mr. Keserovic that he was pleading guilty to a misdemeanor,
not a felony. Id. Based upon counsel's advice, Mr. Keserovic continued with his guilty plea to
the offense of petit theft as outlined in the Rule 11 agreement.
The State filed an Answer (R. at 32) and a Motion for Summary Judgment on October 25,
2012 (R. at 54). Mr. Keserovic filed an Opposition to Respondent's Motion for Summary
Disposition on November 5, 2012. (R. at 80). Subsequent to a hearing on the State's Motion for
3

Summary Dismissal held on December 13, 2012, the Court entered an Order Granting Summary
Dismissal of Post-Conviction Motion Relief on January 28, 2013. (R. at 93). The Magistrate
Court found that trial counsel's performance was deficient, but summarily dismissed the Petition
because the Court believed that Mr. Keserovic was adequately advised by the Court and
Prosecutor of the immigration consequences at his entry of plea. (R. at 96). The Magistrate Court
did not address the issue of prejudice except to say that "whatever deficiency or prejudice
existed ... was cured" by the Court and the State's admonitions. Id. A Judgment of Dismissal was
entered on February 22, 2013. (R. at 100). Mr. Keserovic appealed the Court's Order granting
summary dismissal and denying post-conviction relief and the Judgment of Dismissal. 1 The
District Court reversed the Magistrate Court's summary dismissal and remanded the case for the
Magistrate Court to hold an evidentiary hearing. (R. at 225). The District Court held that the
Magistrate Court erred when it determined that Mr. Keserovic had been adequately advised
regarding the immigration consequences of his guilty plea and when it failed to address whether
there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the prejudice prong. Id. The State now
appeals the District Court's Memorandum Decision and Order.

1 After

proceedings in Federal Court, and during the pendency of Post-Conviction proceedings in this case,
Mr. Keserovic was deported pursuant to his guilty plea in CR-FE-2012-0000311, as the plea resulted in a conviction
ofa crime defined by immigration laws as an "aggravated felony." 8 U.S.C. § l 10l(a)(43)(G).

4

ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Was the District Court correct when it reversed the Magistrate Court's summary dismissal of
Mr. Keserovic's Post-Conviction Petition and remanded the case to the Magistrate Court to hold
an evidentiary hearing?

5

ARGUMENT

The District Court Correctly Decided The Issue Presented On Appeal When It Reversed The
Magistrate Court's Summary Dismissal Of Mr. Keserovic's Post-Conviction Petition For Relief
And Remanded For Evidentiary Hearing Because Mr. Keserovic Presented The Court With A
Genuine Issue Of Material Fact And Provided Admissible Evidence Supporting His Claims

A

Introduction
In January 2013, Mr. Keserovic was stripped of his status as a Lawful Permanent

Resident of the United States and ordered deported for having entered a guilty plea on advice of
his trial counsel, Mr. McKinnie, to an offense that qualifies as an "aggravated felony" under the
Immigration and Nationality Act. The result should not have surprised Mr. Keserovic because as
a non-citizen defendant in criminal proceedings, he is guaranteed effective counsel, which
includes the unequivocal advice that he would be deported if he plead guilty to Petit Theft under
LC. § 18-2407(2). Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010). Had Mr. Keserovic had
effective assistance of counsel, he would have been advised that such a plea would most
certainly result in his deportation.
B.

Standard of Review
On appeal of a decision rendered by the district court acting in its appellate capacity, the

Court directly reviews the district court's decision to determine whether it correctly decided the
issues presented to it on appeal. Barley v. Smith, 149 Idaho 171, 176 (2010). The reviewing court
does so under the same standards employed by the district court. Id. The Court examines the
magistrate record to determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support
the magistrate's findings of fact and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from
those findings. State v. Green, 149 Idaho 706, 708 (Ct.App.2010). The issue is not whether the

6

Petitioner will prevail, but whether the party is entitled to offer evidence to support his claim.
Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 673 (2008).

a. Standard of Review Below
Mr. Keserovic sought post-conviction relief to withdraw a guilty plea that he alleged was

entered unknowingly and involuntarily because defense counsel, Mr. McKinnie, failed to
correctly advise him about the immigration consequences of his plea. Mr. Keserovic bears the
burden of establishing that he is entitled to post-conviction relief by a preponderance of the
evidence. Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271 (Ct.App.2002). In a post-conviction petition
based on a claim that trial counsel failed to advise or misadvised the Petitioner about the
immigration consequences of a criminal conviction, Strickland applies. Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at
1482 (2010); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
When a district court considers an appeal from a magistrate court, the district court is
acting as an appellate court, not as a trial court. State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 596 (1992). The
interpretation of law or statute is a question of law over which the Court has free review. State v.
Miller, 134 Idaho 458, 462 (Ct.App.2000). The district court will not disturb the magistrate

court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612, 617
(2011). A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel presents a mixed question of fact and law,
such that the district court will defer to the magistrate court's factual findings if supported by
substantial evidence, but will exercise free review over the application of the relevant law to
those facts. Id.
An application for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding which is civil in nature.
State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678 (1983); Clark v. State, 92 Idaho 827, 830 (1969); Murray
v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 921 (Ct.App.1992). Summary dismissal of an application pursuant to

LC. § 19-4906 is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56. Like a
7

plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant must prove by a preponderance of evidence the
allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based. LC.§ 19-4907; Russell v.

State, 118 Idaho 65, 67 (Ct.App.1990). An application for post-conviction relief differs from a
complaint in an ordinary civil action, as an application must contain much more than "a short
and plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for a complaint under LR.C.P. 8(a)(l). An
application for post-conviction relief must be verified with respect to facts within the personal
knowledge of the applicant, and affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations
must be attached, or the application must state why such supporting evidence is not included
with the application. LC. § 19-4903. In other words, the application must present or be
accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject
to dismissal.
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary disposition of an application for postconviction relief, either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the court's own initiative.
Summary dismissal is permissible only when the applicant's evidence has raised no genuine issue
of material fact which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the
requested relief. If such a factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted.

Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759, 763 (Ct.App.1991); Hoover v. State, 114 Idaho 145, 146
(Ct.App.1988); Ramirez v. State, 113 Idaho 87, 89 (Ct.App.1987). Summary dismissal of an
application for post-conviction relief may be appropriate, however, even where the state does not
controvert the applicant's evidence because the court is not required to accept either the
applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's
conclusions of law. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647 (Ct.App.1994); Baruth v. Gardner, 110
Idaho 156, 159 (Ct.App.1986).
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On review of a magistrate court's dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without
an evidentiary hearing, the district court must determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists
based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file;
moreover, the district court should liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences in favor
of the non-moving party. Ricca v. State, 124 Idaho 894, 896 (Ct.App.1993).
C.

The District Court Correctly Decided The Issue Presented On Appeal When It
Reversed The Magistrate Court's Summary Dismissal Of Mr. Keserovic's PostConviction Petition For Relief And Remanded For Evidentiary Hearing Because
Mr. Keserovic Presented The Court With A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact And
Provided Admissible Evidence Supporting His Claims

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... have the assistance of Counsel for his
defense." U.S. CONST. AMEND VI. Before deciding whether to plead guilty, a defendant is
entitled to "the effective assistance of competent counsel." McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.
759, 771 (1970); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 686. A claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel may properly be brought under the post-conviction procedure act. Goodwin, 138 Idaho
at 272. To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must show that the
attorney's performance was deficient, and that the defendant was prejudiced by the deficiency.
Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313, 316 (Ct.App.1995); Russell, 118 Idaho at 67. To establish a
deficiency, the applicant has the burden of showing that the attorney's representation fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760 (1988); see also
Russell, 118 Idaho at 67. To establish prejudice, the applicant must show a reasonable
probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have
been different. Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761; see also Russell l l 8 Idaho at 67.
In the case of Padilla v. Kentucky, the United States Supreme Court held that effective
representation under the Sixth Amendment includes counseling a non-citizen defendant about the
9

immigration consequences of a conviction. 130 S.Ct. 1473. Failing to correctly advise a
defendant regarding his potential for deportation constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel
under Strickland. Id. at 1481. Whether a defendant is entitled to relief, is dependent upon a
showing of prejudice that the outcome would have been different based upon accurate advice
under Padilla. Aragon at 761. Further, prejudice from the inaccurate and misleading advice of
counsel cannot be cured by the State or the Court as the obligation to provide accurate advice
regarding immigration consequences falls on defense counsel. Padilla at 1486. Though
statements from the court or the prosecutor regarding possible immigration consequences can
play a useful role in stimulating conversation between the defendant and his attorney, they
cannot substitute for the competent advice regarding the advisability of the guilty plea in light of
the immigration consequences. See In re Resendiz, 25 Cal. 4th 230, 240-42 (2001); and State v.

Paredez, 136 N.M. 533, 537-38 (2004).
D.

The District Court Correctly Held It Was Error When Mr. Keserovic Was Not
Informed Of The Immigration Consequences Of His Guilty Plea
The Magistrate Court correctly held that Mr. McKinnie' s inaccurate advice to

Mr. Keserovic regarding the immigration consequences of his plea to Petit Theft constituted
ineffective assistance. Mr. McKinnie's performance as counsel was deficient within the meaning
of Padilla v. Kentucky because the consequence of pleading guilty to Petit Theft with a 365-day
sentence is virtually certain deportation. 130 S.Ct. 1473. As in Padilla, a simple reading of the
Immigration and Nationality Act would have revealed that virtually certain deportation was the
clear consequence of pleading guilty to theft with a 365-day sentence. Padilla at 1483; see also
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (identifying theft with a one year sentence as an "aggravated felony");

8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (rendering deportable "any alien who is convicted of an aggravated
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felony .... "); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii) (flush language) (alien inadmissible at any time if
convicted of an aggravated felony).
Despite its holding, the Magistrate Court indicated in a footnote that the record was
contradictory about advice given by counsel because counsel had discussions with his client
regarding immigration consequences. See Order, p. 3, n.1. (R. at 95). This conclusion
presupposes that the advice was accurate and met the standard as required in Padilla. The fact
that Mr. Keserovic and Mr. McKinnie both asserted in their respective affidavits that they
discussed immigration issues does not mean that the advice was accurate. A discussion regarding
immigration consequences is not enough. The advice by counsel must be accurate. Padilla, 130
S.Ct. 1473. In this case, the District Court's affirmation of the Magistrate Court's holding was
correct because the record is clear that Mr. McKinnie's advice was indeed inaccurate, failing to
meet the standard of advice required by Padilla.
E.

The District Court Correctly Held That The Magistrate Court Erred When It Found
That Mr. McKinnie's Deficient Performance Was Cured By Inaccurate Advisements
From The Court And State's Counsel
It is correct that Mr. Keserovic must show that Mr. McKinnie's deficient performance

was prejudicial, but the holding that the Court and the State's attorney cured that prejudice is
error and was properly reversed by the District Court.
a. Mr. Keserovic Presented A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact That He Was
Prejudiced By Mr. McKinnie's Deficient Performance
The Magistrate Court erred when it found that Mr. Keserovic could not show that the
result (plea) would have been different but for Mr. McKinnie's deficient performance. The
Court's reasoning was that "[n]otice of the consequences of his plea was, according to the
record, clearly provided." See Order, p.4. (R. at 96). The Court continues by stating that
whatever deficiency or prejudice existed was cured prior to Defendant entering his plea. Id. The

11

Magistrate Court did not make any findings whether Mr. McKinnie's deficient performance was
prejudicial in and of itself. Petitioner's Counsel asserted, and the District Court correctly found,
that this lack of finding is error. (R. at 237-8). The District Court further found that there is a
reasonable probability that Mr. McKinnie's deficient performance was prejudicial to
Mr. Keserovic. Id.
In the context of alleged deficiencies of counsel relating to guilty pleas, the specific
standard for prejudice is whether "there is a reasonably probability that, but for counsel's errors,
[the defendant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Ridgley

v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 676 (2009). "[T]he focus is 'on the defendant's state of mind when
choosing to plead guilty,' and there is no requirement that the Court speculate as to the potential
sentence for a lesser charged offense should the jury convict on that basis at retrial." Booth v.

State, 151 Idaho at 622 (quoting McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847, 853 (2004)).
The Magistrate Court was presented with admissible evidence that supported the claim
that Mr. McKinnie's deficient performance was prejudicial. Mr. Keserovic came to the United
States lawfully as a boy and has continued to live here since. Affidavit of Keserovic, p. l. (R. at
26). The U.S. is the sole home he knows, and his safe haven. Moreover, at the time,

Mr. Keserovic was the father of a four year old U.S. citizen child. Id., p.2. (R. at 27). Had
Mr. Keserovic known that he would be banished from the U.S. for the rest of his life, it is more
than probable that he would have sought different means to resolve his case or taken his chances
at an acquittal at trial. It would have been rational for him to reject the plea deal he ultimately
accepted. In his affidavit, Mr. Keserovic states, "There is no question that I would not admit guilt
to the crime if I had known that this conviction would require my deportation. If I were able to
do it again, I would not admit guilty [sic.] to theft and would take this case to trial." Id
Mr. Keserovic was so concerned with the immigration consequences that he raised the issue with
12

Mr. McKinnie after he had been visited in jail by an immigration officer. Id., p. l. (R. at 26). The
evidence indicates that Mr. McKinnie's advice to Mr. Keserovic was that he could plead guilty
to a misdemeanor without the risk of deportation. Id See also Affidavit of McKinnie, p.1. (R. at
28).

Alternatively, had Mr. McKinnie correctly advised Mr. Keserovic, it is probable that

Mr. Keserovic could have negotiated a deal in which he pled to the same offense but to a 364day sentence, rather than a 365-day sentence. Such a sentence would have taken the crime
outside the "aggravated felony" definition. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G). It is likely that the
prosecutor would have agreed to a 364-day sentence, given the fact that the State agreed to
amend the charge from a felony to a misdemeanor and further agreed to a suspension of the
majority of the 365-day sentence. Clearly, the State was not interested in Mr. Keserovic's
prolonged incarceration. The District Court appropriately made note of this, stating it was "not
apparent to ... that the state would not have gone along with a slightly shorter sentence (shorter by
one day), to accomplish this. (R. at 237).
It is likely that the Court would have entered such a sentence, had it been presented to the
Court as the product of a binding Rule 11 Plea Agreement between the parties. For the foregoing
reasons, Mr. Keserovic undoubtedly suffered prejudice on account of Mr. McKinnie's deficient
performance, but at a minimum presented a genuine issue of material fact as such.
b. The District Court Correctly Decided That The Magistrate Court Erred When It
Found That Any Prejudice From Counsel's Deficient Performance Was Cured By
The State And The Court
The Magistrate Court held that because the State and the Court alerted Mr. Keserovic to
the possibility of deportation, that any prejudice was cured prior to Mr. Keserovic entering his
plea of guilty. See Order, p.4. (R. at 96). The colloquy on the record, as outlined in the Court's
order is as follows:
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[PROSECUTOR:] Judge, I hate to do this to you but prior to accepting the plea of
guilty, we just need to make it very clear on the record the State understands a
petit theft with 365 days as being what the ICE or the federal government
determines to be an aggravated felony even though it is a misdemeanor. It is the
State's understating (sic) that this does subject Mr. Keserovic to deportation and
so in entering this plea of guilty, we just want it very clear on the record that it
does subject him to that potential. (TR pg. 4, 11-20).
The Court then inquired of Defendant's attorney whether he and the defendant had the
(immigration) discussion, to which Defendant's counsel replied:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] On multiple occasions, Judge. We've talked about the
fact that this could raise immigration issues with regard to entering a plea in this
case. (TR pg.4, 23-25)
The Court, addressing Defendant, inquired:
[COURT:] So, Mr. Keserovic, you understand that by entering a plea of guilty to
this charge this morning that it could affect your citizenship, your application for
citizenship or your ability to work in the United States? (TR pg. 5, 1-4).
Order, pp. 2-3. (R. at 94-5). There are two specific errors in the Court's ruling: the State and the
Court cannot act as a replacement for the ill-advice of defense counsel as it is the burden of
defense counsel to provide accurate advice; and, the notice of immigration consequences by the
Court and the State in this case was insufficient under Padilla. The District Court held, in a
footnote, that had the court or the state "explicitly informed [Mr. Keserovic] on the record that
entering his guilty under these circumstances would subject him to mandatory deportation, this
would have been sufficient to adequately inform him of the consequences of his plea." (R. at
237). Petitioner-Respondent asserts that under Padilla, the accurate advice must come from trial
counsel, not the court or state's counsel, so this issue is addressed below. Nonetheless, the
warnings given in this case were inaccurate, and thus the District Court correctly held that trial
counsel's deficient performance was not cured.
1.

It Is The Burden Of Defense Counsel To Provide Accurate Advice Under
Padilla
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Padilla makes it evident that the non-citizen defendant's right to be informed of clear

immigration consequences derives from the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel, and so it is
irrelevant that the court or the prosecutor may have alerted Mr. Keserovic to the consequences
of a guilty plea. In Padilla, the Supreme Court repeatedly stated that the obligation to provide
accurate advice regarding immigration consequences falls on defense counsel. Padilla at 1482,
1486. Statements from the court or the prosecutor regarding possible immigration consequences
can play a useful role in stimulating a conversation regarding immigration consequences between
the defendant and his attorney, but they cannot substitute for competent advice regarding the
advisability of the guilty plea in light of the immigration consequences, as required by the Sixth
Amendment pursuant to Padilla. See Resendiz, 25 Cal.4th at 240-42 (that a defendant may have
received valid advisements [regarding immigration consequences] from the court does not entail
that he has received effective assistance of counsel in evaluating or responding to such
advisements."); Paredez, 136 N.M. at 537-38 (defense attorney "is in a much better position
[than the court] to ascertain the personal circumstances of his ... client so as to determine what
indirect consequences the guilty plea may trigger"). The Washington Supreme Court noted that
the Padilla decision, in highlighting court notification requirements, was "underscore[ing] 'how
critical it is for counsel to inform her noncitizen client that he faces a risk of deportation."' State
v. Sandoval, 249 P.3d 1015, 1020-21 (Wash. 2011) (emphasis in original) (quoting Padilla at

1486). Therefore, as the reasoning of the Padilla decision would be undercut by allowing court
or prosecutor notifications to replace competent attorney advice, this Court should hold that a
court or prosecutor notification is not an acceptable substitute for the competent advice required
under the Sixth Amendment regarding the advisability of entering the guilty plea in light of the
immigration consequences for several reasons.
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The defendant is entitled to rely on his attorney's advice regarding the advisability of
entering the guilty plea, as opposed to the court or the prosecutor's statements regarding possible
immigration consequences, which is given without knowledge of the defendant's unique
circumstances. Attorney competence is presumed under the Sixth Amendment. See Strickland,
466 U.S. at 689 (courts "must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance"). Therefore, the defendant can also
presume that his attorney, who is familiar with the details of his particular situation, has provided
competent advice. See State v. Yahya, 2011 WL 5868794 *5 (Ohio App. 10 Dist. 2011) (despite
court's statement that defendant might get deported, it "might have been reasonable for appellant
to rely on her attorney's specific assurance that she would not be deported"); accord Ex Parte
Solitaria, 2010 WL 2789032 (Tex. App.-Austin). This is well-illustrated in the instant case,

where Mr. McKinnie told a concerned Mr. Keserovic that he would not be deported because his
crime was a misdemeanor. While Mr. McK.innie's statement that Idaho petit theft is a
misdemeanor was correct, he was absolutely incorrect in stating that the crime was not an
aggravated felony under the immigration laws. However, his statements to Mr. Keserovic had the
hallmark of validity because it came from counsel. Therefore, it was reasonable for
Mr. Keserovic to rely on his attorney's erroneous advice as opposed to the court and the
prosecutor's general statement, given without knowledge of the defendant's individual
circumstances, which mentions the possibility of a "negative effect" on immigration status.
Further, the court and the prosecutor's obligations under the Fifth Amendment are legally
and practically distinct from defense counsel's responsibilities under the Sixth Amendment, and
these distinctions render information provided during the plea colloquy and sentencing hearing
an insufficient substitute for competent advice from the defense attorney given before the
defendant decides to plead guilty. In Powell v. Alabama, the Supreme Court put it thusly:
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[H]ow can a judge, whose functions are purely judicial, effectively
discharge the obligations of counsel for the accused? He can and should see to it
that in the proceedings before the court the accused shall be dealt with justly and
fairly. He cannot investigate the facts, advise and direct the defense, or participate
in those necessary conferences between counsel and accused which sometimes
partake of the inviolable character of the confessional.
287 U.S. 45, 61 (1932). This cogent description of the distinct responsibilities of the judge (and,
to some extent, the prosecutor) as opposed to defense counsel continues to reflect the functional
division embodied in our constitutional jurisprudence, and mandates the conclusion that a court
or prosecutorial notification regarding immigration consequences cannot substitute for
meaningful advice from defense counsel given before the defendant decides to enter a guilty
plea.
Moreover, if defense counsel's failure to recogmze the immigration consequences
prevents him from negotiating a reasonable alternative plea that eliminates or mitigates these
consequences, court or prosecutor notifications are unavailing to cure the prejudice flowing from
that error. The Padilla Court specifically contemplated the use of immigration consequences
information not only to inform a defendant's choice regarding a guilty plea, but also to inform
defense negotiation strategy: "Counsel who possess the most rudimentary understanding of the
deportation consequences ... may be able to plea bargain creatively with the prosecutor in order to
craft a conviction and sentence that reduce the likelihood of deportation." Id. at 1486. If the
consequence to the defendant of counsel's failure to appreciate the immigration consequences is
that the defendant loses the opportunity to negotiate a plea that mitigates or eliminates the
immigration consequences, this type of prejudice is not addressed by a court or prosecutor
notification once the negotiations have concluded. Commonwealth v. Clarke, 460 Mass. 30, 47
(2011) (one way to demonstrate prejudice pursuant to Padilla is that "there is a reasonable
probability that a different plea bargain (absent such consequences) could have been
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negotiated"); People v. Bautista, 115 Cal.App.4th 229, 238-42 (2004) (defendant prejudiced by
counsel's failure to "attempt to 'plead upward,' that is, pursue a negotiated plea for violation of a
greater. .. offense" that carried less severe immigration consequences). Thus, the district court
should have held that a court or prosecutor notification does not cure the prejudice that flows
from defense counsel's failure to negotiate a reasonable resolution that mitigates or eliminates the
immigration consequences.
Finally, the Court should consider the context in which any judicial or prosecutorial
warnings were given to the defendant. At the time, the State and the Court addressed
immigration consequences in this case, Mr. Keserovic had already conferred with counsel and
decided on pleading guilty to petit theft with a 365-day sentence. The typical criminal defendant,
when confronted with the formality of the plea colloquy and sentencing hearing, delivered in a
language of legalese not easily understood by laymen, is unlikely to engage in a meaningful
dialogue with the Court or the prosecutor about the decision to accept the plea agreement. The
average defendant is even less likely to question the advice he has received from his trusted
counsel because of statements by a judge or prosecutor during a generally scripted proceeding.
To the extent that the court or the prosecutor phrases the consequences in a reasonably accurate
fashion, the defendant cannot know whether the Court or the prosecutor has gotten it right. It is
significant to note, that in this case, when Mr. Keserovic was confronted with the statements by
the State and the Court regarding possible immigration consequences, he leaned over to defense
counsel and inquired about their meaning. Mr. Keserovic was told that they were just trying to
scare him, and advised he should go forward with this plea. See Affidavit of Haris Keserovic,
p.l. (R. at 26). Mr. McKinnie's advice at that time was to ignore the statements of the State and
the Court, which again, was ill-advised and provided a clear implication to Mr. Keserovic that he
would not face deportation if he pleaded guilty to petit theft with a 365-day sentence.
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ii. The District Court Correctly Held That The State And The Court Provided
Inaccurate Notice To The Defendant Regarding Immigration Consequences,
Thus The Notice Is Insufficient Under Padilla
A statement by a court or prosecutor that deportation is a "potential" consequence of a
guilty plea does not put a defendant whose deportation is virtually certain on notice regarding the
inevitability of deportation. Padilla at 1483 ("when the deportation consequence is truly
clear, ... the duty to give correct advice is equally clear."); accord US. v. Bonilla, 637 F.3d 980,
984 (9th Cir. 2011) ("A criminal defendant who faces almost certain deportation is entitled to
know more than that it is possible that a guilty plea could lead to removal; he is entitled to know
that it is a virtual certainty."); see also Sandoval, 249 P.3d 1015 (granting post-conviction relief
and finding prejudice where defendant had signed a plea agreement containing warning about
immigration consequences); Salazar v. State, No. 11-11-00029-CR, slip op. (Tex. Ct. App. Aug.
31, 2011); State v. Nunez-Valdez, 200 NJ. 129 (2009) (mandating revision of New Jersey's
boilerplate warning to defendants that guilty plea "may" result in deportation where crime is
aggravated felony); People v. Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d 398,407 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) (holding "the
Court's general warning will not automatically cure counsel's failure nor ease the consequent
prejudice").
In this case, the State and the Court, as quoted in the Magistrate Court's Order, advised

Mr. Keserovic that he may face deportation based upon his guilty plea and conviction to petit
theft with a 365-day sentence. (R. at 94-5). This advice is far from clear that Mr. Keserovic
would face virtual certain deportation based upon his plea and conviction. If Padilla requires
defense counsel to give correct advice regarding deportation consequences if they are truly clear
since deportation is an integral part of the penalty that may be imposed, then how can inaccurate
advice from the State and the Court serve as an adequate substitute? As aforementioned, the
deportation consequences in this case were truly clear and could have been easily determined
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from reading the removal statute. Not only was defense counsel's advice in this case incorrect,
but the statements made by the State and the Court to Mr. Keserovic at the plea colloquy were
incorrect. Though Petitioner asserts that notice by the State and the Court can never serve as an
appropriate alternate to the advice of defense counsel, in this case, the statements were incorrect
and did not have the ability to cure any prejudice from Mr. McKinnie's deficient performance.
Because these statements were inaccurate, Mr. Keserovic was never properly advised as to the
immigration consequences as a result of his guilty plea in this case as required by Padilla. The
record is clear on this fact, thus the Magistrate Court erred when it held otherwise and the
District Court correctly reversed the Magistrate Court's decision.
F.

The District Court Correctly Remanded This Case For Further Proceedings
The Magistrate Court summarily dismissed Mr. Keserovic's Petition for Post-Conviction

Relief, holding that "whether deficiency or prejudice existed" was cured by the Court and State's
Counsel prior to his entry of a guilty plea. (R. at 96). Clearly, this holding does not include any
findings regarding prejudice, despite the State's assertions. See Corrected Appellant's Brief, filed
7/25/14, p.10. The District Court applied the appropriate standard of review by not making
findings regarding prejudice, and remanding the case with orders for the Magistrate Court to
make such findings after an evidentiary hearing. The District Court's standard of review, which
must be applied equally by this Court, is to determine whether there is a genuine issue of
material fact, construing any disputed facts in the favor of the non-moving party. LC. § 19-4906.

See also Schultz v. State, 153 Idaho 791, 796 (Ct.App.2012). The District Court found that the
Magistrate Court did not make any findings regarding prejudice, and properly remanded the case
for such findings to be made at an evidentiary hearing.
The Appellant's Brief focuses on whether or not Mr. Keserovic can show prejudice and
asks this court to find that Mr. Keserovic carrnot show prejudice. The applicable standard of
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review does not allow for such a finding. As aforementioned, this Court must determine whether
the district court was correct in finding that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding
prejudice such that the lower court should have granted an evidentiary hearing. Despite the
State's assertion, upholding the district court's decision does not mean that acceptance of the
settlement agreement was irrational, rather that the district court correctly decided that the lower
court did not address prejudice and since a genuine issue of material fact existed, it should have
held an evidentiary hearing. See Corrected Appellant's Brief, p.11.
a. This Court Must Only Look To The Appellate Record In Rendering A Decision
This Court may only look to the record in making its decision. Green, 149 Idaho at 708.
The State repeatedly asks this Court to consider evidence that has not been made a part of the
record in this case. The State asks the court to consider a surveillance video that is not a part of
the record. Corrected Appellant Brief, p. 11. The State further asks this court to consider

Mr. Keserovic's prior criminal record. Id. at p. 12. It would be improper for this Court to
consider extrinsic evidence not reviewed by the District Court. Because the Magistrate Court
summarily dismissed Mr. Keserovic's petition, and further did not make any findings regarding
prejudice, there is nothing for this Court to review regarding whether prejudice existed. Thus, it
was proper for the district court to remand the case for evidentiary hearing on this issue.
b. A Defense Attorney Must Fully And Accurately Advise His Or Her Client Of The
Consequences Of A Guilty Plea
The State asserts in its brief, that "(a]ny defense attorney with a client who is facing
deportation will be in a difficult position." Id. at p.13. Counsel for Petitioner-Respondent does
not deny that the job of a defense attorney can be difficult, but there is nothing difficult about
deciding the type of advice to give to a client. The State presents an example that amounts to
complete nonsense because in both versions, the client is deported. Why would a defense
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attorney choose to give inaccurate advice in this situation so that the defendant could later file a
post-conviction petition? Such attorney would face disbarment, while the client would still be
deported and have to fight the case from a foreign country. It is far from the "Robson's choice"
that the State attempts to describe. Id. Giving inaccurate advice, as in this case, leads a client to
deportation. It does not assist a client to avoid deportation as the State alleges.
A defense attorney must fully and accurately advise a client as to the consequences of a
guilty plea. Many times, a client faces two very difficult decisions. If fully and accurately
advised, the client can make an informed decision, which is all that is constitutionally required.
A defense attorney is not saddled with the obligation to tell the client which choice to make.
Nonetheless, even if trial counsel in this case purposefully gave Mr. Keserovic inaccurate advice,
Mr. Keserovic's plea was made without knowledge of the consequences. Trial counsel's
performance would still be deficient under Strickland, and the District Court still made the
appropriate decision to remand the case for further proceedings on the prejudice prong.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Keserovic asserted that the Magistrate Court erred when it granted summary
dismissal of his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, thereby denying him relief. The District
Court agreed with Mr. Keserovic, and properly remanded the case for further proceedings.
Mr. McKinnie's performance was indeed deficient and Mr. Keserovic's Sixth Amendment right

to the effective assistance of counsel was violated. Based upon the record, the Magistrate Court
had ample admissible evidence that presented a material issue of genuine fact even when viewed
in favor of the non-moving party, thus the summary dismissal of his Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief was error. The Court should have held an evidentiary hearing. Mr. Keserovic respectfully
requests this Court uphold the District Court's decision reversing the Magistrate Court and

22

remanding this case for the Magistrate Court to hold an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Idaho
Code § 19-4907.
~

DATED this .dt:i_ day of August 2014.
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